

# The Role of Elites in Developing Societies

(With Special Reference to Region VIII)

JOSE C. LLAMES

## Introduction

The topic that was first suggested to me for conference discussion was about the role of elites in "modernizing" societies. However, I substituted here the word "developing" for "modernizing" because the term "modernization" usually connotes a "catching up" process of change which in turn implies the compulsive necessity of imitating the standards, values, consumption patterns, and levels of income of advanced, highly developed Western countries.

Historically, modernization is the process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and then have spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian and African continents<sup>1</sup>.

Among the basic assumptions in modernization theories is that the Western path or stages of development will be repeated or can be duplicated in the poorer nations of the world.<sup>2</sup> This assumption is, however, open to serious doubts in view of the extremely

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Assistant Regional Director, Region VIII, Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

<sup>1</sup>S.N. Eisentadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ, 1966.

<sup>2</sup>D. Lerner, "Comparative Analysis of Process of Modernization" in H. Miner (ed.) *The City in Modern Africa*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1967. Lerner confesses that he feels that modernization is neither desirable nor feasible for all countries at the present time, but in so far as their leaders have accepted this as their goal they must acknowledge the demands of the process. See also W.W. Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge University Press, 1960. Mr. Rostow wrote these stages at the Center for International Studies on the Charles River, and has been operationalizing them on the Potomac as President Kennedy's Director of Policy and Planning in the State Department, and President Johnson's chief adviser on Vietnam.

significant differences in the "initial conditions" for development between the poorer countries of the world today and the Western European countries when they had what we now recognize as the industrial revolution. These differences rest on the following considerations. First, the industrialization of the advanced Western countries began, in most cases, under much more favorable conditions of economic organization, political cohesion and stability, and the psychological preparation of the people brought about by the decline of feudal institutions, as well as a very long period of time (at least five centuries) involved through which these processes took place. Aside from the economic difficulties which the present developing countries face today due to the fact that there are already in the world advanced industrial countries which compete with them in trade and investment, they also have to contend with internal political conflicts and instability, with popular demands for high levels of consumption and welfare that is usually imitative of the Western styles of living, and with powerfully entrenched conservative forces with vested interest in maintaining existing feudal structures and colonial patterns of life. Second, the impact of Western industrial nations has destroyed many features of the traditional economy and culture of the poorer nations—by displacing indigenous crafts and trading. A study of underdevelopment of these countries show that through past colonial relations the now developed countries have totally destroyed the preexisting fabric of the backward societies (be it traditional or not). This was most notably the case of India which was deindustrialized by Britain;<sup>3</sup> Africa, where the slave trade transformed society long before colonialism did so again;<sup>4</sup> and Latin America where the high civilization of the Incas and the Aztecs were wiped out altogether.<sup>5</sup> The same thing had practically happened in the Philippines where the Spanish colonizers, in their attempt to

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<sup>3</sup>R. Palme Dutt, *India Today and Tomorrow*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1955; Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, John Day, NY, 1946. As Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru said in this book that "nearly all our major problems today have grown up during the British rule and as a direct result of British policy; the princes; the minority problem; various vested interests, foreign and Indian; the lack of industry and the neglect of agriculture; the extreme backwardness in the social services, and, above all, the tragic poverty of the people."

<sup>4</sup>Basil Davidson, *The African Slave Trade*, Atlantic-Little Brown, Boston, 1961; and Jack Woddis, *Africa, The Roots of Revolt*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1960.

<sup>5</sup>Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1971.

control the natives, "destroyed many material artifacts of the native culture,"<sup>6</sup> and imposed beliefs and practices contrary to the native manner and way of life. In the process, the early Filipino was forced "to give up the crafts he had learned from his forefathers or from the Chinese, Japanese and other races which had traded with the Filipinos before the conquest, and make his living only from the natural fruits of the soil."<sup>7</sup> Third, the development of Western Europe rested upon its early exploitation of Asia and Africa through colonialism and imperialism — a process that cannot be replicated by the poorer, developing nations today<sup>8</sup> who have nobody to colonize and exploit anymore except their own people in the rural hinterlands — a phenomenon known as "internal colonialism."

Another reason for my preference of the use of the word "development" rather than "modernization" is that the latter heavily emphasizes economic growth<sup>9</sup> at the expense of social equity, whereas the former attempts at a balanced thrust towards both economic growth and social equity with a certain degree of emphasis on the latter, at least in the initial stages of development. Economic growth merely implies a rising national income without any concomitant change in the economic and social structure; thus production of a given export commodity may rise — more local industries may be established without substantially affecting the dominance of foreign capital, the dependence upon the industrial nations, the economic imbalance between the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors, and without altering the distribution of the national income or output. Development occurs when these and other similar factors are altered, resulting in human progress or in the

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<sup>6</sup>O.D. Corpuz, *The Philippines*, a Spectrum Book, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ, 1965. An Authorized Reprint, 1970.

<sup>7</sup>Apolinario Mabini, *Revolution Filipina*, a new translation by Leon Ma. Guerrero, published by the National Historical Commission. Reproduced in the Sunday Times Magazine, 11 June 1969. According to Mabini this experience "must have been painful for such radical and violent change of life could not have been accomplished without great cruelties on the part of the conquerors, and unspeakable sufferings and utter exhaustion on the part of the conquered." And "this explains how a society that was already beginning to learn the art of living should return to its infancy and live without consciousness of itself for three centuries."

<sup>8</sup>Peter C. Lloyd, *Classes, Crises and Coups*, MacGibbon & Kee, London, 1971; Michael Barratt Brown, *The Economics of Imperialism*, Penguin, London, 1976.

<sup>9</sup>Lerner, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

improvement of the human condition. Whereas modernization through economic growth is illusive, development in terms of human progress or social improvement is always possible. Human progress has tangible parameters: namely, for all individuals to be adequately fed, appropriately sheltered, and comfortably clothed; for sovereign property resources to be carefully husbanded; and for human rights to be observed with an intent to nurture human freedom, dignity, equality, and security.

I am more inclined to the view that the developing countries of the world should reject the aim of imitating the Western patterns of life. Development is not a linear process, and the aim of development is not to "catch up" with the rich countries economically, socially, politically, and culturally. Many aspects of Western life have become wasteful and senseless and do not contribute to the people's real happiness. For the poor nations to attempt to imitate the rich countries may only mean that they trade one set of problems for another and in doing so discard or destroy much that is valuable in terms of their human resources and values.<sup>10</sup> For example, the developing countries must avoid so-called high technologies which aim to replicate the frivolous consumption pattern of a non-reinforcing kind that consume resources without adding proportionally to material well-being. On the other hand, they must favor technologies which lean on that capital of experience commonly described as local know-how, or appropriate technology. Needless to say, this requires a stronger personal discipline and social consciousness for each citizen in the developing countries, a modest life-style, appropriate methods of production, and patterns of consumption that is different from the "luxurious" Western tastes and values.

Worse still, imitating the conditions of affluence on the implicit assumption that what is good for the rich must obviously be good for the poor places the poorer, developing countries ever more inescapably in a condition of utter dependence on the rich. The most obvious example and symptom is increasing foreign indebtedness. More serious than being placed eternally in a "debt trap" is dependence on the import of highly-expensive sophisticated foreign technology, refined materials, and managerial technical expertise which displace local human labor and destroy the possibility of self-reliance and self-help. The unemployment problem worsens.

<sup>10</sup>*Reshaping the International Order*, A Report to the Club of Rome, Jan Tinbergen: Co-ordinator, Hutchinson, London, 1977, p. 17.

Unintentional neocolonialism and hopelessness for the poor result therefrom. Imitation for imitation's sake is the worst kind of "dependency" whether on the ideological, personal, national, or international level.

### The Concept of Elites

The word "elite" was used in the seventeenth century to describe commodities possessing certain excellence. The usage was later applied to superior social groups such as the crack military units or the upper ranks of the nobility. The term became widely used in social and political writings during the nineteenth century in Europe and during the 1930's in Britain and America when it was diffused through the sociological theories of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca.

The conceptual scheme which Pareto and Mosca have handed down runs thus: in every society there is, and must be, a minority which rules over the rest of the majority of society; this minority — the "political class" or the "governing elite" composed of those who occupy positions of political command and, more vaguely, those who can influence political decisions — undergoes changes in its membership over a period of time, ordinarily by the recruitment of new individual members from the lower strata of society, sometimes by incorporation of new social groups, and occasionally by the complete replacement of the established elite by a "counter elite", as occurs in revolutions. This phenomenon is known as the "circulation of elites."<sup>11</sup>

Elites are sometimes divided into social, political, and economic categories. These include the intellectuals, the managers of industry, and the high government officials including the military, which have often been recognized as the successors of the functions of the earliest ruling classes and as vital agents of social change.

H. D. Laswell, in later studies that have followed Pareto and Mosca, defines elites as "those who get the most of what there is to get." More specifically, he refers to those who have the most of certain values classified under deference, income, and safety. Laswell is chiefly concerned with the problems of political power. His elite group is an aggregate of those with most power and influence

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<sup>11</sup>T.B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1976, p. 12, citing Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (4 Vols. London, Jonathan Cape, 1955; and Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, McGraw-Hill, NY., 1939).

which may be exercised in such a way as to help maintain the existing social structure and its attendant mores, or they may act as innovators or reformers or rebels and help alter the character of the social structure. "The power holders include the leadership and the social formation from which leaders typically come, and to which accountability is maintained, during a given period."<sup>12</sup> The difference from the conception of Pareto and Mosca is that the political elite is distinguished by Laswell from other elites which are less closely associated with the exercise of power, although they may have a considerable social influence, and that the idea of "social formations" (including social classes) from which elites are typically drawn is reintroduced into a scheme of thought from which, especially in Pareto's theory, it had been taken out. A similar development is seen in the writings of Raymond Aron, who has been mostly concerned with the elite in the sense of a governing minority, but has attempted to establish a relation between the elite and social classes,<sup>13</sup> has insisted upon the plurality of elites in modern societies, and has examined the social influence of the intellectual elite, which does not ordinarily form part of the system of political power.<sup>14</sup>

As used in this paper, elites are functional groups which have high status (for whatever reason) within the social system, i.e., in terms of the part they play in preserving or reshaping the social structure. For purposes of this paper, the most significant component of the concept of elite is the one which defines its relationship with the counterpart — the masses or the majority who are "ruled", based on the acknowledged ability of the elites to exert dominant influence in the social action of individuals and groups in society.

The role of elites in the development process will be discussed more fully after we have outlined the structure of underdevelopment and the development imperatives with special reference to Region VIII. Suffice it to say for the moment that there is no area in which the idea of elites is mentioned more often at the present time than in the discussion of the problems of development and underdevelopment. According to Professor T.B. Bottomore, there is a close asso-

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<sup>12</sup>Laswell in H.D. Laswell, D. Lerner, and C.E. Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites*, Hoover Institute Studies, Series B, Elites, No. 1, Standard, 1952.

<sup>13</sup>Raymond Aron, *Social Structure and the Ruling Class*, British Journal of Sociology, I (1), March 1950, pp. 1-16 and I (2), June 1950, 126-43.

<sup>14</sup>See Raymond Aron, *The Opinion of the Intellectuals*, London, 1957.

ciation between changes in social structure and the rise and fall of elites. Economic, political, or other changes first bring about modifications in the prestige and power of different social groups, and those groups which are increasing in power seek to take control of the changes and to press them forward. At the same time, the need for outstanding leaders and elites is most keenly felt by the population whenever complex and difficult social changes are taking place and the familiar, old ways of life are disappearing. In present day developing societies, we have an excellent opportunity to examine the social forces which are creating new elites, as well as the activities of the elites themselves in the attempted transformation of their societies into progressive, economically-advanced nations.<sup>15</sup>

### The Structure of Underdevelopment in Region VIII

Region VIII, comprising the whole of Eastern Visayas with a population of 2,505,819<sup>16</sup> is classified as an economically depressed or distressed area with a low level of development. All the provinces of Region VIII<sup>17</sup> which obtain the lowest median income and the highest proportion of poor families mostly residing in the rural areas show a declining growth rate in income.<sup>18</sup> Income per capita is ₱893.00 annually, or ₱74.00 per month.<sup>19</sup> Income distribution is highly skewed or lopsided with 83.1 per cent of the total number of families earning an income below ₱4,000.00 per annum, while only 1.1 per cent of the total number of families belong to the high income group earning ₱15,000.00 and above per annum.

The structure of development and underdevelopment in Region VIII follows or is a replication or an extension of the national pattern which is characterized by an existence of a so-called dual structure composed of a modern, highly-developed urban sector, and a backward, underdeveloped agricultural sector. The national situa-

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<sup>15</sup>Bottomore, *op. cit.* p. 93.

<sup>16</sup>*Population Dimension of Planning* (PDP), Commission on Population, National Census and Statistics Office, NEDA, 1975.

<sup>17</sup>Leyte, Southern Leyte, Samar, Eastern Samar, Northern Samar, and sub-province of Biliran.

<sup>18</sup>*Social Equity in the Philippines*, A Technical Report, Task Force on Human Settlements-Development Academy of the Philippines, March, 1975, pp. 40-41.

<sup>19</sup>Computed from the *Eastern Visayan Report on the Regional Economy*, 1977, NEDA, Region VIII, Tacloban City.

tion is such that we usually find the privileged dominant position of some few modern, industrial urban centers lording it over the rest of the country usually called the backward, subsistence sector which is placed in a sort of colonial, satellite relationship to the center. This backward, rural agricultural sector characteristically experiences net outflows of capital resources most of which redound to the benefit and advantage of the urban centers where economic growth and progress is rapid, sustained, and cumulative. This *uneven development* results in the unequal distribution of development benefits between regions within the country, among social classes, and ultimately between individual persons. This is best illustrated by the glaring dominance and modernization of the Metro Manila area, and other developed, progressive urban centers like Cebu, over the rest of the countryside which is relatively backward and underdeveloped, like Region VIII. Within Region VIII itself, we witness the concentration of development efforts over time in the Metro Tacloban area, while the rest of the region like Southern Leyte and the Samar provinces are relatively left out or bypassed. On the individual level, this uneven development is shown by the highly skewed income distribution among families both in the regional<sup>21</sup> and in the national levels.<sup>1</sup>

In summary, the region's economy with the exception of few "plantation enclaves," is generally characterized by subsistence agriculture, a small and weak industry sector with primitive technology, and a relatively active service sector. Briefly stated, the underdeveloped condition of Region VIII is characterized by mass poverty, stagnation, and low income per capita which in turn are primarily caused by low productivity, underemployment and total unemployment, severe inequality of access to production resources, and certain deficiencies in education, organization, and discipline especially among the rural people. This is further compounded by a style of development that is based mainly on growth rates (GNP) on the quite assumption that poverty can be taken care of by high growth rates which are expected to filter eventually down to the masses; on a style of development that is urban and elite-oriented rather than rural-oriented; on the overreliance on a technology that is

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<sup>20</sup>*Five-Year Regional Development Plan, 1978-1982*, NEDA, Region VIII, Tacloban City.

<sup>21</sup>*Supra.*

<sup>22</sup>*Five-Year Development Plan, 1978-1982*, NEDA, Manila.



highly capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive, considering the existence of huge surplus of unemployed and underemployed rural labor on the one hand, and acute shortage of capital on the other; and finally, on the adoption of a strategy that is based on the objectives of development in terms of imitating Western living standards which we cannot as a nation afford, at least in the initial stages, since the vast majority of our population are poor.

### **Development Imperatives for Region VIII**

To reverse the foregoing "uneven" and "dual" structure of development and underdevelopment, the national government has recently adopted a five-year, four-point development strategy<sup>23</sup> on the regional level as follows:

1) alleviation of poverty in the rural areas where the bulk of the poor people are found;

2) creation of employment opportunities in rural areas to prevent excessive rural-to-urban migration of underdeveloped and unemployed production segments of society;

3) ensuring minimum food surplus to cover basic requirements of rural people; and

4) production of export products and import-substituting goods to increase the flow of foreign exchange in the rural areas.

The basic objective of the current thrust in the development of regions according to Economic Planning Minister Gerardo P. Sicat in a recent briefing before members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, is to equalize opportunity for each region to exploit its full potential with respect to the economic, social, political, and environmental resources. In fiscal terms, this means that the government spends relatively more money for the rural areas than for the urban areas, and gives greater budget support to depressed and lagging regions like Region VIII in order to achieve equity in development growth.

This is a tall order for Region VIII. Development is much more difficult than is often realized. The variables of the development process are unknown and uncertain, and the political, economic, sociological, and ecological context within which they operate are varied and different. This is further compounded by a well-known

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<sup>23</sup>Briefing of Economic Planning Minister Gerardo P. Sicat before Members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, reported in *Bulletin Today*, Manila, June 21, 1978.

proposition that economic development is held back by a series of "interlocking vicious circles"<sup>24</sup> — of such factors and conditions, obstacles and prerequisites as natural resources, value systems and beliefs, achievement orientation of the people, public administration, and a host of others which are assumed to be scarce and in acute shortage in the developing countries like the Philippines, and most especially in Region VIII.

There is, however, a view that regardless of the degree of any scarcity, there are always and everywhere potential surpluses available which only need to be properly tapped, mobilized, and organized for development. In the language of Harvard Professor of Political Economy Albert O. Hirschman, development depends on the ability of a nation and its citizens to organize themselves for development. Development depends not so much on capital combinations for given resources and factors of production as on calling forth and enlisting for development purposes resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered, or badly utilized.<sup>25</sup> There is therefore an urgent need for a "binding agent" to bring together the various factors and scattered or hidden elements. Without being oblivious of other important factors, we reduce the problem of development, at least for purposes of this paper, to this one basic scarcity — the generating and energizing of human action in a certain direction.

### The Role of Elites in Development

If the difficulty of development lies in the human will and action, then we can place this difficulty back to where all difficulties of human action begin and belong: the human mind. Mr. Hirschman's analysis, with which I am inclined to agree, is simply that backward, underdeveloped, and developing societies failed to take advantage of the development potentials within their respective jurisdictions for reasons largely related to the idea or image of change in the minds of

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<sup>24</sup>H.W. Singer, *Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries*, Social Research, 16 March, 1949, 5, cited in Alberto O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development*, Yale University Press, 1975 Printing.

<sup>25</sup>Hirschman, *Ibid.*, p. 5. Mr. Hirschman further stated that "economists have long realized this situation with respect to labor and have coined the term 'disguised unemployment' to describe it. But just as an underdeveloped economy can mobilize vast hidden reserve of unskilled labor from its redundant peasantry, so it is also to make capital, entrepreneurship, and all the other 'prerequisites' climb unexpectedly on the bandwagon of economic development once it has started to roll."

the national and local elites which make it difficult for them to make the decisions needed for development in the required quantity and at the required speed.

If my observation of the Philippine condition is correct, and this is equally applicable to Region VIII, the basic difficulty lies in somewhat too much emphasis on individual or "ego-focused" image of change based on a highly individualistic criteria of success as against the "group-focused" conception of change which places emphasis on cooperative or community endeavors. Of course, I do not mean that a group-focused idea of change should at all cost be pursued at the expense of the individual, ego-focused approach; and that the individual should by all means be sacrificed to the overriding interest of the collectivity like what is happening in totalitarian socialist societies. These two aspects of human nature—individual and collective — should be kept in proper balance, or more appropriately to borrow the words of Sidney J. Harris, in a state of "creative tension" of a mutually reinforcing kind. This is one of the most difficult things to do especially in formerly colonized territories which have been long exposed to the Western culture of "rugged individualism." The imperatives of change in the developing societies therefore require nothing less than a reeducation of people of a more or less radical kind amounting to a restructuring of the value system by purging it among other things, of colonial bias. It further requires the exercise of a more responsible kind of leadership which is more community-oriented and more dedicated to a direct attack on poverty and the pursuit of equality. And this is where the elites who are considered the influential people in the community ought to come in to provide the necessary energizing action and leadership. The conditions in developing societies are such that elites and leaders who are capable of inspiring effective action, of controlling and directing the events, are greatly needed. This is where the masses who have been maintained in subjection by local or foreign autocratic rulers, lack the experience in social and political organization.

Development strategies today recognize that the attack on underdevelopment must be on a broad front, and must penetrate the whole social fabric to involve the masses. For the success of the various elites in bringing about rapid development depends to a very large extent upon their success in arousing popular enthusiasm, and upon the extent of the support which they can get from major social classes such as the poorer peasants and the industrial workers. The

attempt to win such support and to draw a large number of people into the political and social activities of development takes place in various forms, from the creation of mass parties to the organization of agricultural cooperatives, and the community development schemes. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that the elites are widely separated from the rest of the population — the masses — by their Western-oriented education, their urban bias and culture, and their upper class origins. Thus, it has been argued that the elites exist in “antithetical contradiction” to the masses whom the former are said to dominate, exploit, and oppress, but never liberate in a way of transforming the “unjust reality” the latter are in and according them “full humanity” by no longer treating them as “things” or “objects” but as authentic human beings capable of realizing their human potentialities.<sup>26</sup> The elites, it has been further argued, tend to serve their own interests. They will conceptualize social problems in terms of their own definitions of the situation, in terms of their own view of the social world, which in turn happens to be the view of the particular social class from which they are predominantly drawn.<sup>27</sup> The sad lessons of history especially of the Third World countries seem to confirm this observation.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1972. It must be noted in this connection that current programs to assist small cultivators are inadequate in size and scope compared to those given to big sugar barons and businessmen engaged in medium- and large-scale industries. In fact, according to F.R. Frankel in her book *India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs* (1969) “the scale on which they (rural programs) are being mounted suggests that the ‘small farmer’ is still being treated as if he belonged to a residual or marginal category. Unfortunately the opposite is true.” This may be reflective of an elitist conception of the lives of the poor as “without consequence” and hence must be “excluded from the light of the public realm where excellence can shine.” The poor stands in darkness wherever he goes. As John Adams puts it, “the poor man is not disapproved, censured, or reproached; *he is only not seen.*”

<sup>27</sup>David Berry, *Central Ideas in Sociology: An Introduction*, Constable, London, 1974.

<sup>28</sup>Gunnar Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty*, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970. In this book, Myrdal again and again stresses the degree to which *elitism* is the major obstacle to economic development. He identifies all the underdeveloped countries as being more or less *soft states*, the term being understood “to comprise all the various types of social indiscipline. . . . The laxity in a national community that can be characterized as a soft state can be, and are, exploited for personal gain by people who have economic, social and political power.” Thus, for example, vital land reform and taxation laws on income and

Development cannot take place without political stability. And if political stability through national integration is to be achieved, a way must be found to resolve or supersede such seeming contradiction or polarity between the elites and the masses. A "close bond" or "partnership" with the people on the basis of mutual respect, freedom, and human dignity and not on the basis of domination, exploitation, and oppression seems to be the only way out short of violent resolution. A leadership that crystallizes and expresses the problems and aspirations of the majority of the people, identifies itself with them and promotes their interest, is badly needed here. The peasants and the workers need the help of the elites at least at the start of their movement for liberation and development.

In spite of the prominent role which elites and individual leaders play in the underdeveloped countries, it is not, in the last resort the activities of these elites and the leaders alone which can decide the success, or determine the form and the course of development which they have entered. Needless to say, the elites must be capable, efficient, and dedicated, but that is not enough. In the language of T. B. Bottomore, they must also express adequately and pursue steadfastly, the ideals and aspirations of the masses who are still struggling in their age-old poverty and subservience.<sup>29</sup>

It seems from the foregoing consideration that the first task of an elite is to liberate himself from himself — from deeply held, narrow anti-development values and vested interest to a perspective which provides widening horizons, and the involvement and participation of the masses. This requires the reeducation of the self — an inner transformation or internal change, most especially amounting to a "decolonization" of one's ideology or perspective of development, purging it of irrelevant foreign content and replacing the same with new norms and values most relevant, congenial, and politically feasible to the country's needs and traditions. In our context, a truly Filipino ideology is envisioned here — an ideology of the Filipinos, by the Filipinos, and for the Filipinos which must express and seek to attain the truest and highest values and ideals and destiny of the

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wealth are thwarted because, "if they were strictly formulated and effectively implemented, they would have effects on social and economic stratification." The reason that soft state impedes development is fundamentally due to the fact that "all power is in the hands of the upper class who can afford egalitarian laws and policy but are in unchallenged position to prevent their implementation."

<sup>29</sup>Bottomore, *op. cit.* p. 110.

Filipino nation. Furthermore, it must arise from, respond to, the Filipino situation, Filipino problem, and Filipino needs. Finally, this ideology must be formulated by the Filipino people themselves. The task of our elites and leaders in this connection is to have a genuine dialogue with the various social classes and groups and correctly translate the problems, sentiments, aspirations, values, and ways of the people into a formulation which the people in turn recognize and accept as their own.

The involvement of the people in a sense of deepened consciousness is very crucial here. For the society we seek is not something that can be built merely by a leader for his people, though we are in need of leaders with vision and great resolve. The new society will be founded on the character and will of our people so that what will make it vital and alive are the people who constitute it and the quality of purpose and resolve in their lives.<sup>30</sup>

What our elites should first realize in this direction is the fact of an ever widening income gap, and the consequent dehumanizing poverty of the masses. Such situation calls to mind the apt observation of Laski "of the normal life of the poor, their perpetual fear of the morrow, their haunting sense of impending disaster, their fitful search for a beauty which perpetually eludes."<sup>31</sup> The necessary implication here seems to be that the "wretched of the earth," the "rejects of life," need first of all liberation as a precondition of freedom and true human liberty. Does it require an abrupt radicalization of society which in Herbert Marcuse words consists of "rupture with the continuum,"<sup>32</sup> or a gradual evolutionary transformation? Whatever may be the way, development must proceed from this premise of emancipation and liberation of the oppressed and the underprivileged of our society from physical, mental, psychological, cultural, and institutional bondage. Otherwise, all else will fail again in this and in the coming decades as it has failed in the past. Utopian? Well, to borrow again from Mr. Marcuse, what is denounced as "utopian" is no longer that which has no place in the historical universe, but rather that which is blocked from coming about by the power of established societies.

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<sup>30</sup>Francisco S. Tatad, *The Prospects of the Filipino*, Raya Books, Manila, 1978.

<sup>31</sup>H. Laski, "Liberty in the Modern State" 34 (1949) cited in a Philippine Supreme Court decision in the case of *Chaves vs. Zobel, et al.*, G.R. No. L-28609, promulgated 17 January 1974.

<sup>32</sup>Herbert Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, Penguin, 1972.

As intimated in the preceding portion of this paper, society is transformed by altering, among other things, the psychology of its members, especially its leaders, if we are to change their "way of doing things." It seems that the toughest challenge for elites in this connection is to transcend their elitist "selves" and be one with the people in an authentic transformation of the social order. Since this is basically a function of education and training, educational reforms are therefore an urgent need. The one-sided emphasis on purely intellectual formation must be replaced by a training of the whole character, and the stress on individual achievement must be overcome by more teamwork. Of course, in introducing educational changes, a balance between two extremes should be achieved. It is particularly important, for example, that a balance be found between a wide curriculum and specialization.<sup>33</sup>

Institutional change is also very crucial in the development process. In this connection, the most important institution is public administration, the government being the source of political authority and the locus of power which makes it the best instrument of change. It is therefore essential that it functions well. So that to build an administration which is competent and honest, imbued with a spirit of service, and willing to listen to local people are essential tasks for the elites in the government. Specifically, means must be provided by which local communities can make their voice heard and combined in local action. This in turn requires a balance between the reality of political power, the ideal of regular and development-oriented administration, and the value of dynamic popular representation,

What are the prospects for change in this direction? Well, for one thing, no society is culturally and structurally completely homogeneous. The seeds of change and growth are always there. W. Moore, for example, suggests that every society is always oriented towards change because there are no overall solutions to the basic problems it faces. Change may result from the strains inherent in the social system, such as demographic imbalances, scarcity situations, and conflicting value orientations among its members.<sup>34</sup> And emancipation, liberation, both from natural and

<sup>33</sup>Jan Tinbergen, *Development Planning*, Weidenfield, London, 1967.

<sup>34</sup>Wilbert E. Moore, "A Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XXV, December, 1960, pp. 810-818, in J.D. Montgomery & W.J. Siffen, *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change*, McGraw-Hill, NY

man-made shackles takes place in the interplay of these different value systems, each of which is struggling for ascendancy or supremacy. It is this inherent dynamic struggle that provides occasion for the release or liberation of the "creative potentialities of mankind" from oppressive or repressive forces.

We are living in a revolutionary time which has given birth to a "new humanism," one in which man is defined first of all by his responsibility to his fellowmen and to history.<sup>35</sup> We are also witnessing today something more profound — a revolution of consciousness which is wrestling with deeper beliefs that underlie the existing social and economic systems. And gradually, the ties that held people to the old ways of thinking are loosening and new ties are being formed to a new outlook. Conceivably, it could alter the whole aspect of Philippine society and produce a new breed of Filipinos.

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<sup>35</sup>De Ecclesia in Mundo Huius Temporis (The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World) promulgated by his Holiness Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965, published in *The 16 Documents of Vatican II*, St. Paul Publications, Philippines.